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INTRODUCTION 
Late one night in March 1977 a dozen armed men burst into the 
home of Alejandra Aguiar, checked her name off a list, bashed her 
head against the wall, and whisked her away to a detention center.1 
Military officials later drugged Alejandra, and murdered her by 
hurling her drugged body from a navy plane over the Atlantic 
Ocean.2 Alejandra was a nineteen-year-old philosophy student whom 
the Argentine government had labeled a political subversive, just like 
thousands of other Argentines who disappeared from 1976 to 1983 
during military rule.3 Despite the horrific nature of such crimes, 
international law does not currently consider them to be acts of 
genocide. 
When the international community drafted the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide 
Convention”) in 1948, it formulated the agreement in such a way that 
it only included four protected groups: “national, ethnical, racial or 
religious.”4 Since the Genocide Convention came into effect the 
world has borne witness to terrible atrocities—such as those 
described above in Argentina—that legally do not fit the definition of 
genocide.5 The events  in  Argentina  do  not  fit in  the  definition of 
 
 1. Ian Black, Thirty Years On Argentina Still Tries to Come to Terms with its 
“Dirty War”: Anniversary of Military Coup Proves Fresh Source of Pain for 
Relatives of the “Disappeared”, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 22, 2006, Int’l 
News §, at 23, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/mar/22/argent 
ina.ianblack. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. See 
William A. Schabas, Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First 
Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 23, 36 (2001) (describing this limitation of four protected 
groups as “one of the most controversial aspects of the definition of genocide”). 
 5. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The 
Sounds of Silence, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 82 (1989), as reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST ET 
AL., HUMAN RIGHTS MODULE: ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, GENOCIDE, 
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genocide because political groups—like those targeted in 
Argentina—are specifically excluded under the Genocide 
Convention.6  
Most international law supports the current definition of genocide 
and excludes political groups.7 Legal actions involving Spain, 
Argentina, and Guatemala, however, interpreted the definition of 
genocide differently. This Comment argues that the courts in these 
cases utilize questionable legal reasoning in light of prevailing 
international legal standards, illustrating a frustration with current 
accepted standards. It goes on to recommend that rather than allow 
courts to struggle with the current restrictive definition of genocide, 
the international community should expand the definition to include 
political groups. 
Part I of this Comment describes the creation of the Genocide 
Convention, and subsequent international case law that attempts to 
clarify the definition of genocide. Next, Part I gives a brief history of 
the Dirty War in Argentina and the civil war in Guatemala which 
serve as the factual backdrop for the legal actions that will be the 
focus of this piece. Part II introduces and analyzes cases dealing with 
Argentine and Guatemalan officials accused of genocide. This 
Comment asserts that although the Spanish and Argentine cases do 
not coincide with current international standards, they illustrate 
distinct problems with the definition of genocide as it currently 
stands. Finally, this Comment suggests some ways to change the 
currently accepted definition in order to remedy these problems. 
I. BACKGROUND 
To appreciate the current international understanding of the groups 
the Genocide Convention protects, one must first appreciate the 
 
OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS, AND WAR CRIMES 89–92 (2d ed. 2006) 
(discussing the targeting of political opponents that took place under the Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia, and arguing that such acts constitute genocide). 
 6. See Schabas, supra note 4, at 36 (pointing out that various critics have 
found fault with the Genocide Convention because of its failure to protect political 
groups). 
 7. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS MODULE, supra note 5, at 73-112 
(excerpting various decisions from international tribunals which discuss the 
definition of genocide). 
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Convention’s history and subsequent interpretations.8 A review of 
the development of the concept of genocide shows that the current 
international understanding of the term does not envisage the 
protection of political groups.  
A. THE HISTORY OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS REGARDING THE INCLUSION OF POLITICAL GROUPS 
IN THE DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE 
The drafters of the Genocide Convention approved the agreement 
on December 9, 1948.9 The Convention lays out the definition of the 
crime of genocide in Article 2.10 The key clause lists “national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” as those which the 
Convention protects.11 The first step a court must therefore take in 
deciding whether genocide occurred is to determine whether a 
particular actor intended to eliminate one of the four enumerated 
groups.12 If the targeted group does not fit into one of these protected 
groups, the court  must  then conclude  that  genocide did not occur.13 
 
 
 8. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2000) (analyzing the definition of genocide by looking at the history of the 
Genocide Convention and the debates that took place during the drafting of the 
Convention). 
 9. See David Lisson, Defining “National Group” in the Genocide 
Convention: A Case Study of Timor-Leste, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2008) 
(indicating that it took over two years after the signing of the Genocide Convention 
for it to enter into force on January 12, 1951). 
 10. See id. (noting that although Article 1 classifies genocide as a crime under 
international law, the fact that Article 2 defines the crime makes that article truly 
important). 
 11. See Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. 2 (“In the present Convention, 
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such . . . .”). 
 12. See JOHN QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ANALYSIS 146 (2006) (clarifying that a prosecutor needs to identify a 
protected group in order to go forward with a criminal prosecution of genocide); 
Lisson, supra note 9, at 1460 (elaborating that the threshold issue in genocide 
litigation is whether the targeted group constitutes one of the categories that the 
Genocide Convention protects). 
 13. See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 124, 
138 (June 2) (holding that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (“NATO”) 
bombing of Yugoslavia was not genocide because NATO did not target a protected 
group). 
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These protected groups are fraught with ambiguity that makes their 
meanings elusive.14  
The history of the Genocide Convention helps shed some light on 
the meaning behind the listed protected groups. The United Nations 
General Assembly’s Resolution 96(I), a precursor to the Convention, 
analogizes genocide to the domestic law crime of homicide.15 Just as 
the key element of homicide is the taking of another human being’s 
life, regardless of who that human being is, the Resolution argued 
that the key element of genocide is the taking of a human group’s 
life, regardless of the characteristics that bind the group.16 As such, 
the identity of the victim group is not significant in concluding 
whether genocide occurred under this definition.17 
Resolution 96(I) goes on to list certain groups against whom 
criminal actors committed genocide in the past.18 The list includes 
both political groups and “other” groups, the latter of which could 
conceivably be a catchall term for various types of groups.19 
 
 14. See id. at 146 (claiming that the identification of protected groups has 
turned out to be an issue of great controversy in international criminal trials). 
 15. See G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188-89, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946) 
(explaining that the difference between homicide and genocide is that homicide 
takes place on an individual level while genocide takes place on a group level). 
 16. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 248–59 
(4th ed. 2007) (laying out the elements of first degree murder, and emphasizing 
that the intent element requires only the intent to kill any human being). 
 17.  Eduardo Rodolfo Freiler, Consideraciones Acerca del Delito de 
Genocidio, Según Algunos Proyectos Legislativos Tendientes a su Incorporación 
al Código Penal Argentino [Considerations Regarding the Crime of Genocide, 
According to Some Legislative Projects Attempting to Incorporate the Crime into 
the Argentine Penal Code], in APORTES JURIDICUOUS PARA EL ANALISIS Y 
JUZGAMIENTO DEL GENOCIDIO EN ARGENTINA [A LEGAL APPROACH TO THE 
ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT OF GENOCIDE IN ARGENTINA] 33, 41 (Eduardo Rezses 
ed., 2007) (quoting Daniel Feierstein and claiming that the analogy between 
homicide and genocide in Resolution 96(I) implies that the groups listed later in 
the Genocide Convention’s definition are merely examples, and are not meant to 
be restrictive). 
 18. See G.A. Res. 96(I), supra note 15, at 189 (“Many instances of such crimes 
of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other groups have 
been destroyed, entirely or in part.”). 
 19. Compare Freiler, supra note 17, at 41 (arguing that the term “other” 
strongly supports the notion that the identity of the victim group is not a vital issue 
in determining whether genocide occurred), with SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 148 
(asserting that the debates surrounding Resolution 96(I) do not signal in any way 
that one should interpret the term “other groups” liberally to include any group). 
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Considering the implications of the comparison between homicide 
and genocide, and the inclusion of political and other groups, this 
earlier definition of genocide is rather expansive.20  
The Genocide Convention reined in the more open-ended 
definition of genocide that Resolution 96(I) endorsed.21 The travaux 
préparatoires of the Genocide Convention show that there was debate 
on a number of issues when deciding on the definition of genocide.22 
The framers of the Convention struggled with conflicting desires and 
goals when drafting the document.23 The result was a series of 
compromises. 
Perhaps the most notable exclusion from the Convention was that 
of political groups as one of the protected groups.24 The countries 
that opposed the inclusion of political groups claimed that political 
groups were not stable enough to warrant the Convention’s 
protection because affiliation with such groups was voluntary and 
subject to change.25 Some delegates argued that political groups 
 
 20. See Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L & 
COMP. L.J. 1, 27 (1994) (explaining that the U.N. Secretary General viewed the 
definition of genocide in Resolution 96(I) in this expansive light, as manifested by 
the fact that he used the Resolution as the basis for the broad definition of genocide 
in his Comment on the Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide). 
 21. See Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing 
the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2264 (1997) 
(characterizing the Genocide Convention’s definition as significantly different 
from the definition included in Resolution 96(I)). 
 22. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 8 (detailing the different debates 
involved in the drafting of the Genocide Convention in order to supplement our 
current understanding of the crime). 
 23. See Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law,  Defining 
Protected Groups Under the Genocide Convention, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 
2010–11 (2001) [hereinafter Defining Protected Groups] (indicating that the 
drafters wanted to punish the specific acts of the Nazis, but also hoped to establish 
a definition that was flexible enough to cover potential future genocidal acts that 
might differ from the specific techniques the Nazis employed). 
 24. See SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 140 (noting that since 1948 various 
commentators have unrelentingly criticized the lack of political groups in the 
Genocide Convention’s definition). 
 25. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG 
LEGACY 33–35 (2d ed. 2001) (contrasting political groups with the more stable 
groups which the drafters ultimately decided to include in the Genocide 
Convention). 
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would encompass too imprecise a concept, and thus cause too many 
problems.26 The drafters of the Convention ultimately left out 
political groups not due to the logical force of such claims, but rather 
as a political compromise to placate countries such as the Soviet 
Union.27 This explicit exclusion of political groups is persuasive 
evidence that, though the founders contemplated the inclusion of 
political groups, they did not intend the Convention to protect such 
groups.28  
Since the Convention’s entrance into force important international 
agreements have used the Convention’s definition of genocide 
verbatim.29 The statutes that formed both the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)30 and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)31 utilize the exact same 
definition of genocide as the Genocide Convention.32 The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court also incorporated an 
identical definition.33 By choosing to use the Convention’s precise 
 
 26. See Defining Protected Groups, supra note 23, at 2011 (referencing the 
Soviet delegate’s rationale that if political groups were included there would be 
risk that the Genocide Convention would encompass political crimes of all sorts 
(quoting ALAIN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
5 (Alison Marschner trans., 1995))). 
 27. See id. (observing that many governments could have been threatened by 
charges of genocide if political groups were included in the crime’s definition 
(quoting Diane F. Orentlicher, Genocide, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC 
SHOULD KNOW 154 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999))); see also SCHABAS, 
supra note 8, at 133 (emphasizing that the decision to leave out political groups 
from the Genocide Convention was primarily motivated by an effort to convince a 
minority of states to sign on to the agreement). 
 28. See William A. Schabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: 
Conflicting Interpretations from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 375, 377 (2000) (contending that there is “no doubt” 
that the drafters intended the four enumerated groups in the Genocide Convention 
to be an exhaustive list). 
 29. See SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 142 (indicating that most states that have 
codified the crime of genocide also utilize the Genocide Convention’s definition 
verbatim). 
 30. Statute of the International Tribunal art. 4, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192. 
 31. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1602. 
 32. JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 
652–53 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that the international community established the 
ICTR and ICTY to bring justice to those responsible for gross human rights 
violations in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia). 
 33. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187 
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definition   in   these  agreements,  the  international  community  has 
demonstrated an implicit desire to exclude political groups from 
protection.34  
B. CASE LAW INTERPRETING THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
ESTABLISHES THAT PROTECTED GROUPS MUST HAVE STABLE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Before the establishment of the ICTR and ICTY, some advocates 
made an effort to interpret the definition of genocide in a different 
context.35 Human rights activists David Hawk and Hurst Hannum 
prepared a draft memorial for the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) accusing Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime of committing 
genocide against the Cambodian people.36 In their brief, Hannum and 
Hawk argued that the protected group was the national group of all 
Khmer people.37 They further claimed that Pol Pot’s regime intended 
to destroy the part of that national group that did not conform to the 
regime’s political ideology.38 The brief concluded that Pol Pot’s 
regime was therefore guilty of genocide against a national group.  
 Hannum and Hawk’s interpretation has not prevailed in the ICTY 
and ICTR. Since their establishment, the ICTR and ICTY have 
interpreted the definition of genocide on multiple occasions and have 
 
U.N.T.S. 93 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 34. See SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 143–44 (referencing meetings of various 
international bodies within the past fifteen years where the participants discussed 
the definition of genocide, but did not engage in serious debate regarding whether 
to add political groups to the definition); Lisson, supra note 9, at 1463 
(acknowledging that the inclusion of the Genocide Convention’s definition in 
recent international instruments makes it hard to argue that customary international 
law now protects additional groups not included in the Convention’s definition). 
 35. See HUMAN RIGHTS MODULE, supra note 5, at 89 (arguing that the Khmer 
Rouge committed genocide in Cambodia, even though critics sharply contested 
such a conclusion). 
 36. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 610–11, 617–19 (describing the 
atrocities that the Khmer Rouge committed and the efforts of Hawk and Hannum 
to persuade countries to bring a claim against the Khmer Rouge in the ICJ). 
 37. See Hurst Hannum & David Hawk, The Case Against the Standing 
Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, Draft I.C.J. Memorial, 133–50 
(1986), as reprinted in DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 617–19 (describing how 
the Khmer people are a national group because they share a distinct language and 
history, among other attributes). 
 38. See id. (claiming that the Khmer Rouge intended to eliminate all those who 
did not conform to the State’s conceptions of social and ideological purity).  
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held that one cannot read the Genocide Convention to protect 
political groups.39 A key conclusion these courts have reached is that 
for the Genocide Convention to protect a particular group, the 
characteristic which defines the group must be stable and 
unchanging.40  
One such decision in which the ICTR reached this conclusion was 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu.41 In that case the court conceded that 
protected groups aside from the four listed in the Genocide 
Convention may exist.42 The court focused on the similarities 
between the four listed groups, and held that a protected group must 
be “stable and permanent” to warrant the Genocide Convention’s 
protection.43 Akayesu is also important because the court defined 
national group as “a collection of people who are perceived to share 
a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity 
of   rights   and   duties.”44  This   definition  of   national   group  has 
persevered, and the ICTR and ICTY have not significantly developed 
the concept any further.45 
 
 39. See Lisson, supra note 9, at 1465 (explaining that ICTR cases have held 
that the Genocide Convention protects only stable and permanent groups, thus 
excluding political, economic, and other unstable groups). The ICTY has also 
limited the Convention’s protections to stable groups having immutable 
characteristics. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS MODULE, supra note 5, at 76–86, 
106–112 (excerpting and discussing the importance of various ICTY and ICTR 
cases which interpret the definition of genocide); Lisson, supra note 9, at 1465-67 
(discussing the ICTY’s narrow interpretation of genocide). 
 40. See QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 147 (explaining that many commentators 
viewed this interpretation as a major innovation). 
 41. Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998), aff’d, Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Appeals Judgment (June 1, 2001); see also 
Lisson, supra note 9, at 1464 (pointing out that Akayesu was the ICTR’s first 
genocide conviction). 
 42. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 516 (arguing that the four listed 
groups were not meant to be restrictive, but rather they indicate the types of groups 
that the Genocide Convention was meant to protect). 
 43. Id. ¶¶ 511, 516 (explaining that group members will often acquire such 
characteristics automatically at birth, and will not be able to alter them). 
 44. Id. ¶ 512; see also, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n 
on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study of the Question of the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (July 4, 1978) (prepared by Nicodeme Ruhashyankiko) 
(explaining that individuals in the same national group share a specific language, 
culture, and way of life indicative of a particular nation). 
 45. See Lisson, supra note 9, at 1467. 
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Two cases decided a year after Akayesu also held that the 
Genocide Convention does not protect political groups. The ICTR in 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda46 and the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Jelisic47 
both concluded that the Genocide Convention only protects stable 
and permanent groups.48  
Jelisic is also important for the court’s discussion of whether a 
protected group must objectively exist, or if it is enough if the group 
subjectively exists in the mind of the perpetrator.49 The court adopted 
a purely subjective approach, holding that courts should judge the 
existence of a national or ethnic group from the perspective of the 
criminal actors.50 Thus, even if a national group does not exist in 
objective reality, if the group exists in the mind of the perpetrator, 
the Genocide Convention will still protect that group.51 Various cases 
from the ICTR adopt some form of this subjective approach.52  
 
 46. Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Judgment (Dec. 6, 1999), aff’d, Rutaganda v. 
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appeals Judgment (May 26, 2003). 
 47. Case No. ICTY-95-10-T, Trial Judgment (Dec. 14, 1999), aff’d, Prosecutor 
v. Jelisic, Case No. ICTY-95-10-A, Appeals Judgment (July 5, 2001). 
 48. See id. ¶ 69 (explaining that the drafters of the Genocide Convention meant 
to protect groups whose members had no choice about whether they should be a 
part of the group or not); Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶ 57 (concluding that 
the drafters of the Genocide Convention excluded political and economic groups 
because they are mobile groups that one may join through individual commitment). 
 49. See Schabas, supra note 4, at 38-39 (citing Jelisic as illustrative of the 
ICTY’s approach to determining the existence of a protected group). 
 50. See Jelisic, Case No. ICTY-95-10-T, ¶ 70 (reasoning that the subjective 
approach is preferable because it is those who differentiate the targeted group from 
other members of the community that define the victim group). 
 51. See Lisson, supra note 9, at 1466 (positing that this approach is necessary 
to protect various victim groups because collective identities are not based solely 
on objective facts, but rather emanate from social constructs as well). 
 52. See Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 
811 (Dec. 1, 2003), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 
Appeals Judgment (May 23, 2005) (emphasizing that courts must look to objective 
and subjective criteria in determining the existence of a protected group); 
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 317 (May 15, 
2003), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Appeals Judgment 
(May 20, 2005) (holding that to determine whether a particular group constitutes a 
protected group, the court should look to the objective traits of the “social or 
historical context,” along with the perpetrator’s subjective view regarding the 
targeted group’s existence); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 
Trial Judgment, ¶ 98 (May 21, 1999), aff’d., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. 
ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Judgment (June 1, 2001) (explaining that courts can define 
an ethnic group by an objectively shared language and culture, by the fact the 
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Another relevant case from the ICTY is Prosecutor v. Krstic.53 
Krstic partially clarifies what the Genocide Convention means when 
it defines genocide as the destruction of one of the four protected 
groups in whole or in part. The ICTY held that Bosnian Muslims 
who lived in Srebrenica formed a part of the protected national group 
of all Bosnian Muslims in the country.54 Krstic stands for the 
proposition that to destroy a group in part, the criminal actors must 
attempt to destroy that part of a group precisely because it belongs to 
a larger targeted group.55 One such instance is the attempted 
destruction of the targeted group’s population in a particular 
geographical location.56  
C. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS IN ARGENTINA AND GUATEMALA 
The cases to be examined find their grounding in the acts the 
governments of Argentina and Guatemala perpetrated in the 1970s 
and 80s.57 To truly understand these cases, one must first understand 
the historical context that made the crimes possible. 
1. Argentina’s Dirty War  
From 1976 to 1983, Argentina lived under a military junta that 
actively worked to eliminate its so-called enemies.58 Many often 
 
group itself subjectively believes that it is a unique ethnic group, or by the fact that 
the perpetrators of the crime subjectively identify the group as a distinct ethnic 
group). 
 53. Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 561 (Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, 
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004). 
 54. See id. ¶ 559 (concluding that one cannot consider the Bosnian Muslims of 
Srebrenica an entire national group of its own, but rather the national group 
consists of all Bosnian Muslims). 
 55. See id. ¶¶ 559-60 (stressing that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica 
constituted a protected group not because of their geographical location, but rather 
because they were Bosnian Muslims). 
 56. See HUMAN RIGHTS MODULE, supra note 5, at 74 (arguing that a group in 
part may also include such sectors as the “intellectual elite or women who are 
targeted because they are members of a relevant group”). 
 57. See Anne J. Barry, Argentina: The Dirty War, the Disappeared, the 
Mothers and the Grandmothers, http://lacc.fiu.edu/events_outreach/fulbright/proj 
ect_08.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2010) (characterizing the period of the military junta 
in Argentina as a horrific phase in that country’s history). 
 58. See Tribunal Oral Federal de La Plata [Juzg. Fed.] [Federal Court of la 
Plata], 19/9/2006, “El Estado v. Etchecolatz, Miguel/juzgado penal,” [State v. 
Etchecolatz/criminal case] (Arg.), aff’d by Cámara Nacional de Casacion Penal 
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refer to this period as the Dirty War.59 It resulted in the disappearance 
of an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 people.60  
After the Dirty War ended in 1983, newly elected President Raul 
Alfonsín helped facilitate the prosecution of the junta leaders.61 In 
Causa 13/8462 [Suit 13], the Cámara Federal [Federal District Court] 
of Buenos Aires convicted various junta leaders.63 Soon after the 
decision, however, fear of a military rebellion led to amnesty laws 
and pardons which left almost all military leaders immune from 
prosecution.64 At the insistence of human rights activists, Argentina’s 
Congress annulled the amnesty laws in 2003, which allowed 
prosecutors to reopen their cases against Dirty War participants.65  
 
[C.N.C.P.] [Criminal Court of Appeals], 18/5/2007, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recursos de casación e inconstitucionalidad,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/appeal challenging constitutionality] (Arg.), and Corte Suprema de 
Justicia [CSJN] [Supreme Court of Justice], 17/2/2009, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recurso extraordinario,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/Supreme Court 
appeal] (Arg.), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/etche.html 
(explaining that enemies were those whose political ideologies were incompatible 
with the military junta’s sociopolitical ideologies). 
 59. See generally IAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA’S 
DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1990) (detailing 
personal stories of victims of the Dirty War). 
 60. See Rebecca Lichtenfeld, Case Study Series, Accountability in Argentina: 
20 Years Later, Transitional Justice Maintains Momentum, INT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/con 
tent/5/2/525.pdf; Barry, supra note 57 (explaining that the Dirty War also involved 
the forced transfer of detainees’ children to military families actively involved in 
the junta’s regime). 
 61. See Lichtenfeld, supra note 60, at 2 (detailing how President Alfonsín 
pushed the Congress to pass a law which set up military courts to try the junta’s 
key leaders). 
 62. Cámara Federal de Buenos Aires [CFed.] [Federal District Court of Buenos 
Aires], 9/12/1985, “Causa 13/84/juzgado penal” [suit 13/84/criminal case] (Arg.), 
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/causa13/fallo.html. 
 63. See id. at para. 10 (sentencing the former leader of the Army, Jorge Rafael 
Videla, to “reclusión perpetua” (indivisible penalty of 40 years in prison) and the 
former head of the Navy, Eduardo Massera, to life imprisonment). 
 64. See Lichtenfeld, supra note 60, at 3 (explaining that the full stop law of 
1986 established a sixty-day deadline to begin new prosecutions against those 
responsible for the Dirty War and that the law of due obedience of 1987 gave 
immunity to all army personnel with the rank of colonel or lower based on the 
theory that they were following orders); id. (recounting that in 1989 President 
Carlos Menem issued two general pardons for military officers still facing trial and 
for some officers who the State had previously convicted). 
 65. See Christian Tomuschat, Issues of Universal Jurisdiction in the Scilingo 
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2. Guatemala’s Civil War 
From 1960 to 1996, Guatemala was the scene of a civil war 
targeting the Mayan indigenous population.66 State actors killed 
approximately 200,000 people and another 40,000 were the victims 
of forced disappearances.67 Most of the victims were part of the 
Mayan indigenous population and were targeted because state 
officials believed the Mayans served as the support base for an anti-
military guerilla movement.68  
II. ANALYSIS 
Three key cases evolved from the aforementioned conflicts in 
Argentina and Guatemala. Specifically, prosecutors and/or third 
parties accused defendants from Argentina of genocide in the 
Scilingo69 and Etchecolatz70 cases, and Rigoberta Menchú filed a 
complaint accusing Guatemalan officials of genocide.71 Despite the 
 
Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1074, 1075 (2005) (noting that in 2005 the Argentine 
Supreme Court held that the due obedience and full stop laws were 
unconstitutional, which removed any doubts about the constitutionality of 
Congress’s annulment of the laws in 2003). 
 66. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Making the State do Justice: Transnational 
Prosecutions and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed 
Conflict Guatemala, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 79, 83 (2008) (emphasizing that the State 
killed and abducted the majority of its victims at the end of the 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s). 
 67. See id. (citing these statistics from a report of the United Nation’s 
Commission on Historical Clarification (“CEH”)). 
 68. See id. (pointing out that according to the CEH, the Guatemalan military 
was responsible for over ninety percent of the deaths in Guatemala’s civil war). 
 69. SAN [Spanish National Appellate Court], Sala de lo Penal [Criminal 
Chamber], Nov. 4, 1998 (No. 84/98) “Caso Scilingo” [Scilingo Case], available at 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/espana/audi.html. 
 70. Tribunal Oral Federal de La Plata [Juzg. Fed.] [Federal Court of la Plata], 
19/9/2006, “El Estado v. Etchecolatz, Miguel/juzgado penal,” [State v. 
Etchecolatz/criminal case] (Arg.), aff’d by Cámara Nacional de Casacion Penal 
[C.N.C.P.] [Criminal Court of Appeals], 18/5/2007, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recursos de casación e inconstitucionalidad,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/appeal challenging constitutionality] (Arg.), and Corte Suprema de 
Justicia [CSJN] [Supreme Court of Justice], 17/2/2009, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recurso extraordinario,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/Supreme Court 
appeal] (Arg.), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/etche.html.  
 71. Querella de Rigoberta Menchú Tum al Juzgado Central de Instrucción de 
Guardia de la Audiencia Nacional [Rigoberta Menchú Tum’s Complaint filed in 
the National Appellate Court], S. Audiencia Nacional [Spanish National Appellate 
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fact that the drafters of the Genocide Convention specifically left out 
political groups, the courts in the cases with Argentine defendants, 
and Menchú in her complaint, found a way to interpret the 
Convention as including the types of atrocities at issue.  
Though novel and creative, the arguments in the Scilingo and 
Etchecolatz cases, and Menchú’s complaint, have weak legal 
analyses. Their claims go against the brunt of international 
jurisprudence, and are thus suspect. These cases do illustrate, 
however, a frustration with the currently accepted definition of 
genocide. 
A. THE SPANISH AUDIENCIA NACIONAL HELD IN SCILINGO THAT 
GENOCIDE OCCURRED IN ARGENTINA BECAUSE OF THE 
GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS TO DESTROY A NATIONAL GROUP 
Of the two cases involving Argentine defendants, the Audiencia 
Nacional72 (the “Audiencia”) in Spain decided one of them in 1998.73 
The Scilingo case involved Adolfo Scilingo, a former Argentine 
naval officer charged with committing crimes against humanity and 
genocide.74 Although the Audiencia did not ultimately find Scilingo 
guilty of genocide,75 the court held in an interlocutory order that 
 
Court], Dec. 2, 1999 (No. 331/99), available at http://blogderechopenal.blogs 
pot.com/ [hereinafter Menchú’s Complaint]. 
 72. RICHARD J. WILSON, PROSECUTING PINOCHET IN SPAIN, 6 HUM. RTS. BR. 3, 
3 (1999) (describing the Audiencia Nacional as a special court in Madrid with the 
power to prosecute cases involving serious crimes such as international terrorism 
and drug trafficking). 
 73. See id. (explaining how through a process known as popular action the 
complainants were able to bring a complaint against an Argentine citizen for 
crimes committed against Spanish citizens living in Argentina at the time of the 
alleged acts). 
 74. Scilingo, (No. 84/98) at “ANTECEDENTES DE HECHO: SEGUNDO”; see Julia 
K. Boyle, Note, The International Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violators: Spain’s Jurisdiction over Argentine Dirty War Participants, 22 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 191 (1998) (describing Scilingo’s 
participation in the murder of supposed dissidents by throwing them, drugged and 
unconscious, into the Atlantic Ocean from airplanes above). 
 75. See STS [Spanish Supreme Court], Sala de lo Penal [Criminal Chamber], 
Oct. 1, 2007 (No. 798/2007), available at http://www.d 
erechos.org/nizkor/espana/juicioral/doc/sentenciats.html (affirming the lower 
court’s decision that Scilingo was guilty of crimes against humanity, but not 
genocide). 
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genocide did take place in Argentina.76 The court reached this 
conclusion based on its interpretation of the term “national group” 
from the Genocide Convention.77 The court’s argument was that 
“national group” should include groups within a particular nation 
targeted because of certain characteristics peculiar to that group.78 In 
the case of Argentina, the national group consisted of those in 
Argentina whom the State considered contrary to its goals.79  
The court justified its interpretation of national group by invoking 
the spirit of the Genocide Convention.80 The court concluded that one 
cannot construe the category of national group narrowly to mean a 
“group formed by people who belong to the same nation,” but rather 
must interpret the term to mean simply “a national human group, a 
distinct human group, characterized by something, integrated into a 
larger community.”81 Thus, even though the individuals targeted 
were not all Argentines in the sense that they were Argentine 
citizens, they all belonged to a human nation residing within the 
borders of Argentina, and the State singled them out because it 
believed  they  were  contrary  to  the Government’s goals.82 Because 
the State targeted this group—which the court considered a national 
group—the Audiencia held that genocide did occur in Argentina.83  
 
 76. See Wilson, supra note 72, at 3 (summarizing the procedural steps in the 
case that led public prosecutor Eduardo Fungairiño to challenge Magistrate Judge 
Baltazar Garzón’s jurisdiction to proceed with Scilingo and a parallel Chilean case, 
which ultimately led to the Audiencia’s interlocutory order). 
 77. See Scilingo, (No. 84/98) at “FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO: QUINTO” 
(explaining that although the Spanish Penal Code includes the crime of genocide, 
the court was interpreting the Genocide Convention’s definition because one must 
interpret Spain’s codification of the crime in light of the Genocide Convention). 
 78. See id. (listing AIDS patients, the elderly, and foreigners living within a 
country as examples of such a national group). 
 79. See id. (emphasizing that the targeted group included not only those 
opposed to the regime, but also those indifferent to the regime that the Government 
nonetheless perceived as a threat). 
 80. See id. (highlighting the strong obligation that the parties to the Genocide 
Convention felt to ensure that future perpetrators of genocide were not allowed to 
go unpunished). 
 81. Id. (Howard Shneider trans.). 
 82. See id. (pointing out that the military junta killed Spaniards and other 
foreigners in addition to Argentine citizens). 
 83. See id. (reiterating that any other reading of national group would go 
against the spirit of the Genocide Convention). 
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B. THE AUDIENCIA’S INTERPRETATION OF GENOCIDE IN SCILINGO 
CONTRADICTS THE ICTR’S HOLDING IN AKAYESU 
Although a new and interesting interpretation, the Scilingo 
decision presents various problems.84 The first issue is that despite 
the court’s efforts to avoid the classification of political group, its 
arguments that the State targeted the victim group in Argentina for 
reasons aside from its political ideology are not convincing.85 
Although it is true that the regime imputed political opinions to some 
of its victims, the State still targeted the victims for what it perceived 
to be their political leanings.86 Thus, it seems disingenuous to avoid 
the most obvious issue at play: that the targeted group was a political 
group, and that if the Genocide Convention does not protect political 
groups, one should not consider the crimes of the Dirty War to be 
genocide.87 
1. The Group the Court Identifies in Scilingo Is not Stable and 
Permanent  
When the Spanish courts decided Scilingo, the only relevant 
genocide case that the ICTY or ICTR had decided was Akayesu. The 
ICTR held that perhaps there were protected groups aside from the 
four groups the Convention listed. However, those protected groups 
must   be   stable   and  permanent.   No  matter   how  the  Audiencia 
 
 
 84. See QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 187-88 (observing that Scilingo drew much 
criticism for its interpretation of genocide). 
 85. See, e.g., Brief of the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights 
Clinic at Yale Law School as Amicus Curiae Supporting Complainants, STS 
[Spanish Supreme Court], Sala de lo Penal [Criminal Chamber], Oct. 1, 2007 (No. 
798/2007), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/juicioral/doc/ 
yaleamicus1.html#racial [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (referencing a 1976 secret 
order of the armed forces to detain “political dissidents” after the military coup 
was successful). 
 86. See id. (explaining that the junta’s plan involved the elimination of all those 
who were against the idea of a military-run nation, and those who did not support a 
westernized, Christian society). 
 87. See id. (arguing that the Audiencia should not find Scilingo guilty of 
genocide in part because the Genocide Convention does not protect political 
groups); SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 144 (claiming that the destruction of political 
groups is not genocide, but that this in no way gives states a license to eliminate 
such groups). 
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classifies the victim group in Scilingo, the Convention would not 
protect it under Akayesu.88  
The State did not single out the targeted group during the Dirty 
War due to stable characteristics that the group could never change.89 
On the contrary, if the victims had fully supported the military junta, 
it is unlikely the State would have targeted them.90 Although at times 
the State imputed political ideology to the victim, those perceived 
ideas were still not something inherently part of the victim that one 
could consider stable in the sense the court in Akayesu discussed.91 
As a result, the Spanish court’s reasoning is questionable under 
Akayesu.92 
2. The Audiencia’s Labeling of the Group as a National Group Is 
Unconvincing  
Even if it were possible to view the group described in the Scilingo 
case as the type of stable group which the Genocide Convention 
could protect, the court’s use of the category of national group is also 
dubious.93 The generally accepted conception of national group 
 
 88. See SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 130–31 (reiterating that the major holding of 
Akayesu was that the protected group must be permanent and stable). 
 89. See Kurt Mundorff, Other Peoples' Children: A Textual and Contextual 
Interpretation of the Genocide Convention, Article 2(e), 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61, 89 
(2009) (detailing the debates surrounding the drafting of the Genocide Convention, 
in which the British delegation argued for the inclusion of political groups, but 
recognized that such groups are clearly not stable). 
 90. See SAN [Spanish National Appellate Court], Pleno de la Sala de lo Penal 
[Criminal Chamber, en banc], Nov. 4, 1998, “Caso Scilingo” [Scilingo Case], 
interlocutory order (No. 84/98), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/es 
pana/audi.html (emphasizing the group consisted of those who the State believed 
to be getting in the way of the State’s objectives). 
 91. See, e.g., MIRTA MÁNTARAS, GENOCIDIO EN ARGENTINA [GENOCIDE IN 
ARGENTINA] 68-69 (2005) (illustrating the fluidity of the targeted group with a 
story of how the Government killed a formerly trusted nurse working in a hospital 
after the Government suspected she had changed her political leanings).  
 92. See QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 188 (criticizing the Audiencia for analyzing 
genocide utilizing a social conception of the term, rather than fully examining the 
crime’s legal definition (citing ALICIA GIL GIL, DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL: 
ESPECIAL CONSIDERACIÓN DEL DELITO DE GENOCIDIO [INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW: SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE] 187 (1999))). 
 93. See id. at 187–88 (arguing that the State’s intention to eliminate Argentines 
of a particular political mindset is not the same as intending to destroy Argentine 
nationals). 
SHNEIDER_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:15 PM 
2010] POLITICAL GENOCIDE IN LATIN AMERICA 331 
articulated in Akayesu94 involves “a legal bond based on common 
citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.”95 This 
definition emphasizes the notion that whatever country the victim 
group has the most bonds with defines the applicable national 
group.96  
This interpretation of national group does not apply to the case of 
Argentina because the group that the State targeted included 
members that had close bonds with many different nations.97 
Although the victims were all in Argentina at the time, there were 
various immigrants who were part of the victim group who had 
closer bonds with their countries of origin.98 As such, the common 
link among targeted individuals was not a “legal bond” based on 
“common citizenship,” but rather the group members’ actual or 
perceived political opinions.99 Thus, under Akayesu those that the 




 94. See Lisson, supra note 9, at 1467 (conceding that despite its shortcomings, 
the definition of national group in Akayesu is the commonly accepted definition in 
genocide jurisprudence). 
 95. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 512 
(Sept. 2, 1998), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Appeals 
Judgment (June 1, 2001); see Lisson, supra note 9, at 1467-68 (explaining that the 
court lifted this definition from the ICJ’s Nottebohm decision, which defined the 
concept of nationality rather than national group). 
 96. See Nottebohm (Liech. V. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6) (holding that a 
national of a particular state is “more closely connected with the population” of 
that State “than with that of any other state”); see also SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 
115 (arguing that it does not make sense to apply the Nottebohm decision to the 
definition of national group, because Nottebohm referred to nationality, which is a 
concept with very different implications than national group). 
 97. See GUEST, supra note 59, at 64–65 (indicating that almost six hundred 
foreigners disappeared during the Dirty War). 
 98. See id. (explaining that from 1976 to 1983 some fifty governments made 
inquiries to the Argentine Government regarding 2,928 disappearances). 
 99. See Lisson, supra note 9, at 1468-69 (recognizing that under the Nottebohm 
definition that Akayesu utilizes, for an individual to be considered a national of a 
country there must be a very close relationship between the individual and the state 
that represents that individual’s interests). 
 100. See QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 188 (asserting that the Audiencia’s 
interpretation could have made more sense if it characterized the genocide as the 
destruction in part of the larger group of all Argentine nationals, rather than 
defining the national group narrowly as only political dissidents). 
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Some scholars, viewing the Akayesu definition as incomplete, 
have interpreted national group to mean “national minorities.”101 This 
idea encompasses a minority population in one state that shares its 
ethnic, linguistic, or religious identity with each other and a 
population that constitutes the majority in another state.102 The 
Audiencia, however, did not attempt to classify the targeted group as 
a homogeneous minority population. To the contrary, the court 
focused on the heterogeneous nature of the targeted group.103 As a 
result, the national minority interpretation does not lend support to 
the Spanish court’s conclusions.104  
One could argue that it is irrelevant that the Scilingo court’s 
interpretation does not fall in line with Akayesu because international 
case law is not binding on domestic courts.105 Furthermore, as a trial 
court decision handed down only three months prior to Scilingo, 
Akayesu is not overly persuasive authority. Finally, when the Spanish 
courts decided Scilingo, various human rights advocates had already 
argued that genocide should encompass the targeting of political 
groups.106  
 
 101. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 556 
(Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals 
Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004) (arguing that the four protected groups in the Genocide 
Convention were meant to signal the destruction of any national minority, rather 
than to limit the Convention’s application to only those four groups); Lisson, supra 
note 9, at 1469 (explaining that in this context scholars use the term national 
minority in the same manner that people understood the term in early to mid-
twentieth century Europe). 
 102. See Lisson, supra note 9, at 1469 (stating that these groups also feel united 
by their shared identity). 
 103. See SAN [Spanish National Appellate Court], Pleno de la Sala de lo Penal 
[Criminal Chamber, en banc], Nov. 4, 1998, “Caso Scilingo” [Scilingo Case], 
interlocutory order (No. 84/98), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/es 
pana/audi.html (pointing out that the victims ranged in their race, language, and 
cultural roots). 
 104. See SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 150 (characterizing the Scilingo court’s 
reasoning as leading to an absurd result because its loose interpretation of national 
group essentially covers the entire human race). 
 105. See Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the 
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35 
(2006) (explaining that stare decisis does not apply in the context of international 
law). 
 106. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 616–17 (discussing Hannum and 
Hawk’s efforts to convince members of the international community that genocide 
should include the targeting of political groups); Matthew Lippman, The 
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Even though the Audiencia was not bound by Akayesu, however, 
the Audiencia’s interpretation of genocide is still unconvincing. 
Rather than grapple with the actual words and travaux préparatoires 
of the Genocide Convention, the Audiencia references the 
amorphous concept of the Convention’s spirit, which is not grounded 
in any textual reality.107 And rather than engage in analytical legal 
reasoning, the Audiencia satisfies itself with vague references of a 
moral imperative to classify the events in Argentina as genocide.108 
While such arguments may be convincing from a philosophical point 
of view, they are not convincing from a legal reasoning perspective. 
Keeping in mind the court’s lack of coherent legal reasoning, 
incorporating an analysis of Akayesu would have helped add a 
needed legal foundation to Scilingo. 
Considering the Scilingo court’s refusal to mention Akayesu and 
its lack of legal analysis in general, one could view the Spanish 
court’s decision as an attempt to open the door to a new 
interpretation of the Genocide Convention.109 The decision shows a 
frustration with the narrow definition found in the Genocide 
Convention, as well as with interpretations of the Convention that 
put emphasis on group stability. Although the ICTR and ICTY did 
not follow the Audiencia’s interpretation in any of its cases, Scilingo 
nonetheless turned out to be significant in the Etchecolatz case.110  
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty 
Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415, 464 (1998) (asserting that the 
Genocide Convention should protect political groups because government actors 
have historically attacked political movements, and similarly to religious groups, 
political groups are usually bound by a common vision); Van Schaack, supra note 
21, at 2280–86 (arguing that the jus cogens norm of genocide that has developed 
over time includes the destruction of political groups, despite their exclusion from 
the Genocide Convention). 
 107. See generally Scilingo, (No. 84/98). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 79–81 (describing how 
customary international law develops by many states manifesting their 
dissatisfaction with the status quo of international law through state practice, such 
as the decisions of domestic courts). 
 110. See Tribunal Oral Federal de La Plata [Juzg. Fed.] [Federal Court of la 
Plata], 19/9/2006, “El Estado v. Etchecolatz, Miguel/juzgado penal,” [State v. 
Etchecolatz/criminal case] (Arg.), aff’d by Cámara Nacional de Casacion Penal 
[C.N.C.P.] [Criminal Court of Appeals], 18/5/2007, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recursos de casación e inconstitucionalidad,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/appeal challenging constitutionality] (Arg.), and Corte Suprema de 
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C. IN ETCHECOLATZ, AN ARGENTINE COURT FOUND THAT CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY OCCURRED IN THE CONTEXT OF GENOCIDE 
The case of Miguel Etchecolatz involved the first criminal 
prosecution of a Dirty War figure in Argentina since the repeal of the 
amnesty laws.111 Etchecolatz, a senior officer of the Buenos Aires 
Provincial Police during the Dirty War, faced charges of crimes 
against humanity for committing murder, kidnapping, and torture.112 
In 2006 the Tribunal Oral Federal [Federal Trial Court] of La Plata 
found Miguel Etchecolatz guilty of crimes against humanity.113 
Although the court did not find Etchecolatz guilty of genocide, it 
held in dicta that his crimes occurred in the “context of genocide,” 
thus concluding that a genocide did occur in Argentina.114 The 
Tribunal Oral Federal’s decision was affirmed by both the Cámara 
Nacional de Casacion Penal [Criminal Court of Appeals]115 and the 
Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice],116 but neither 
 
Justicia [CSJN] [Supreme Court of Justice], 17/2/2009, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recurso extraordinario,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/Supreme Court 
appeal] (Arg.), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/etche.html 
(quoting various passages from Scilingo). 
 111. See Condenaron a reclusion perpetua a Etchecolatz [Etchecolatz is 
sentenced to life imprisonment], CLARIN.COM, Sept. 19, 2006, 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/09/19/um/m-01274351.html (stressing the 
importance of Etchecolatz’s conviction as the first Dirty War participant of many 
to go on trial since the annulment of the amnesty laws). 
 112. See Etchecolatz, 19/9/2006, at “RESULTA” [HOLDING] (describing 
Etchecolatz’s involvement in various clandestine torture facilities throughout 
Buenos Aires and surrounding towns). 
 113. See id. at Sec. IV.(a) “DELITOS DE LESA HUMANIDAD” [CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY] (analyzing why Etchecolatz’s crimes constitute crimes against 
humanity). 
 114. See id. at Sec. IV.(b) “EL GENOCIDIO” [THE GENOCIDE] (mentioning at the 
outset of the genocide analysis that there exists an ethical and judicial need to 
classify the events in Argentina during the Dirty War as genocide). 
  115. See Cámara Nacional de Casacion Penal [C.N.C.P.] [Criminal Court of 
Appeals], 18/5/2007, “Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/recursos de casación e 
inconstitucionalidad,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/appeal challenging 
constitutionality] (Arg.), aff’d, Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN] [Supreme Court 
of Justice], 17/2/2009, “Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/recurso extraordinario,” 
[Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/Supreme Court appeal] (Arg.) (affirming the 
Tribunal Oral Federal’s decision, but failing to discuss the crime of genocide in its 
affirmance). 
  116. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN] [Supreme Court of Justice], 
17/2/2009, “Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/recurso extraordinario,” [Etchecolatz, 
Miguel Osvaldo/Supreme Court appeal] (Arg.), available at 
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court discussed the issue of genocide.117 Accordingly, although the 
Tribunal Oral Federal’s treatment of genocide was not necessary to 
the holding, considering that higher courts have not analyzed the 
issue, the Tribunal Oral Federal’s discussion lays the groundwork for 
future Argentine courts’ analysis of the crime of genocide in the 
context of the Dirty War.118 
The court’s analysis of genocide begins by referencing Resolution 
96(I), the precursor to the Genocide Convention. The court 
acknowledged that while Resolution 96(I) included political groups 
as a protected group, the drafters of the Genocide Convention 
purposely excluded political groups. The court glossed over this 
exclusion, however, attributing it solely to the political environment 
at the time.119  
The court next discussed previous cases dealing with the Dirty 
War. The opinion first referenced Causa 13/84,120 in which the 
Cámara Federal [Federal District Court] of Buenos Aires convicted 
former junta leaders before President Menem subsequently pardoned 
them.121 The court in Causa 13/84 described the systematic 
 
http://www.cij.gov.ar/adj/ pdfs/ADJ-0.288435001237979621.pdf (affirming the 
decision of the Cámara Nacional de Casacion Penal, but neglecting to discuss the 
crime of genocide in its affirmance).    
  117. See Alejandra Dandan, A encariñarse con la celda [Set to spend a long time 
in a prison cell], PAGINA12.COM, May 24, 2007, http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diari 
o/el 
pais/1-85457-2007-05-24.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (explaining that the 
Cámara Nacional de Casacion Penal was not required to discuss the crime of 
genocide in its decision since the Tribunal Oral Federal’s treatment of the issue 
was not part of that court’s holding).   
 118. See Etchecolatz, 19/9/2006, at Sec. IV.(b) “EL GENOCIDIO” [THE 
GENOCIDE] (observing that the court’s ruling will be the first of many dealing with 
Dirty War participants).  
 119. See id. (noting that the first draft of the Genocide Convention included 
political groups, but failing to mention any legitimate reasons other than “political 
circumstances” as to why the final draft excluded political groups). 
 120. See id. (referring to Causa 13/84 as a historic case because it held State 
officials responsible for their actions). 
 121. Camara Federal de Buenos Aires [CFed.] [Federal District Court of Buenos 
Aires], 9/12/1985, “Causa 13/84/juzgado penal” [suit 13/84/criminal case] (Arg.), 
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/causa13/fallo.html; see also Sang 
Wook Daniel Han, Transnational Justice: When Justice Strikes Back—Case 
Studies of Delayed Justice in Argentina and South Korea, HOUS. J. INT’L L. 653, 
661 (2008) (discussing President Menem’s pardon of sentenced junta leaders) 
AUTHOR CHECK 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:15 PM 
336 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:313 
widespread operation of the junta that inflicted large-scale death, 
torture, and persecution on the local population.122 The court next 
quoted portions of the Audiencia Nacional’s Scilingo decision to 
further illustrate the systematic plan of the military junta.123 This 
portion of the opinion characterized the targeted group in the same 
way the Audiencia did in Scilingo—as perceived political 
subversives. 
The court concluded its genocide analysis by identifying the 
protected “national group” as all Argentines.124 The court reasoned 
that “because the Genocide Convention includes the terms ‘in whole 
or in part,’ it is evident the Argentine national group was eliminated 
‘in part,’ and a part sufficiently substantial to alter social relations 
throughout the nation.”125 As a result, the court concluded that 
genocide did occur in Argentina during the Dirty War.126  
D. THE INTERPRETATION OF NATIONAL GROUP IN ETCHECOLATZ 
CONTRADICTS INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP  
One should consider the Etchecolatz court’s conclusions in light of 
the more extensive set of international jurisprudence and scholarship 
regarding genocide at the time of the decision. Keeping such 
international decisions in mind, the Etchecolatz decision is flawed. 
The court in Etchecolatz argued that genocide occurred in 
Argentina in a way that vacillates at times in its conception of 
national group.127 When the court quotes Scilingo, it conceptualizes a 
national group made up only of political dissidents.128 However, at 
 
 122. See Etchecolatz, 19/9/2006, at Sec. IV.(b) “EL GENOCIDIO” [THE 
GENOCIDE] (listing kidnapping, violent interrogations, and killing of victims as 
some of the methods used). 
 123. See id. (emphasizing that the State had no intention of changing the group 
members’ political opinions, but rather wanted to eliminate the group). 
 124. See id. (implying that the state intended to eliminate a part of the Argentine 
population in order to alter and modify the life of all Argentines). 
 125. Id. (Howard Shneider trans.). Indicating that the phrase “in part” from the 
Genocide Convention was meant to apply precisely to situations such as the Dirty 
War. Id. 
 126. See id. (drawing similarities to the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, and 
the Rwandan genocide). 
 127. See id. (quoting sources that classify the national group differently). 
 128. See id.; see also QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 187-88 (emphasizing that the 
court in Scilingo defined the genocide in Argentina as involving the intended 
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the end of its genocide analysis, the court characterizes the national 
group as the entire Argentine population.129 Whether one interprets 
the court’s description of the protected group as the narrower group 
of perceived political dissidents, or as the larger group of all 
Argentines, the court’s analysis is flawed in light of international 
jurisprudence. 
1. The Court’s Interpretation of National Group as Political 
Subversives Goes Against Recent International Jurisprudence and 
Scholarship 
The first idea of national group the court discusses is the same as 
that formulated in Scilingo. The conception of national group in this 
part of the court’s decision is the group that the military junta felt 
was a threat to the State’s goals. This vision of a protected group not 
only goes against Akayesu, but also contradicts Rutaganda130 and 
Jelisic131, which the ICTY and ICTR handed down well before 
Etchecolatz.  
All three cases from the ICTY and ICTR held that protected 
groups under the Genocide Convention must have stable and 
permanent characteristics.132 Akayesu also noted that the drafters of 
the Genocide Convention excluded political groups because of the 
 
destruction of a whole national group, rather than the elimination in part of a 
group). 
 129. See Etchecolatz, 19/9/2006, at Sec. IV.(b) “EL GENOCIDIO” [THE 
GENOCIDE] (referring to the genocide as the intended destruction in part of a 
national group consisting of everyone in Argentina during the Dirty War). 
 130. Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 374-
75 (Dec. 6, 1999), aff’d, Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, 
Appeals Judgment (May 26, 2003). 
 131. Prosecutor v. Jelesic, Case No. ICTY-95-10-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 69-70 
(Dec. 14, 1999), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Jelesic, Case No. ICTY-95-10-A, Appeals 
Judgment (July 5, 2001). 
 132. See Jelesic, Case No. ICTY-95-10-T (highlighting the dangers of defining 
groups without using objective criteria and adopting “stable” groups as the 
applicable objective standard); Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, Trial Judgment 
(identifying the factors establishing the Tutsi’s identity as an ethnic group, 
including customary rules in Rwanda that determined ethnic groups based on 
patrilineal standards); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial 
Judgment, ¶ 511 (Sept. 2, 1998), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-
4-A, Appeals Judgment (June 1, 2001) (concluding that members of a protected 
group are generally unable to choose to leave that group). 
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groups’ mobile and changing nature.133 The group of political 
subversives the court discussed in Etchecolatz, however, was by no 
means stable and unchanging—people were able to change their 
political affiliations if they so desired. As such, just as the 
Audiencia’s interpretation in Scilingo failed under the international 
jurisprudence which existed at the time, so too does the court’s 
interpretation in Etchecolatz.  
One could again argue that such international cases are not binding 
on the Argentine court. The Etchecolatz court, however, chose to cite 
other nonbinding international law sources in order to bolster its 
conclusions regarding genocide.134 Rather than only cherry-pick 
international law authority that supported its conclusions, the court 
should have also engaged with all relevant sources, even if such 
sources went against the court’s conclusions.135 
Furthermore, although the ICTY and ICTR decisions were not 
binding on the Etchecolatz court, the reasoning of those cases is 
persuasive because international tribunals have handed down 
multiple decisions defining protected groups. It is easier to 
understand the Scilingo court’s failure to engage with international 
case law because Akayesu was the only case at the time undertaking 
the “permanent and stable” analysis.136 When the Tribunal Oral 
Federal decided Etchecolatz, however, the ICTR had decided 
Akayesu and Rutaganda, and the ICTY had decided Jelisic.137 As a 
result, although the ICTY and ICTR cases were not binding upon the 
court, it makes sense to analyze Etchecolatz in light of such case law.  
Recent scholarship suggests an alternative view of national group, 
arguing that if a particular group has the right to self-determination, 
 
 133. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 511 (explaining that the genocide 
pertained to “stable” groups generally determined by birth as opposed to “mobile” 
groups in which membership is voluntary). 
 134. See Etchecolatz, 19/9/2006, at Sec. IV.(b) “EL GENOCIDIO” [THE 
GENOCIDE] (citing Scilingo and Resolution 96(I) to support its interpretation of 
genocide). 
 135. See id. (failing to even mention Akayesu, Rutaganda, or Jelisic in the 
court’s discussion of genocide). 
 136. See LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 27 (2d ed. 2007) 
(implying that when only one decision supports a particular holding, that decision 
may not be very persuasive authority). 
 137. See id. (suggesting that the more courts there are that endorse a holding, the 
more persuasive that holding becomes). 
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then courts should consider that group to be a national group.138 
However, one cannot characterize the targeted group in Etchecolatz 
as a group legally entitled to self-determination.139 This is the case 
because the targeted group was not a group that had any sort of legal 
claim to its own independent country. Thus, even this alternative 
view of national group focusing on a right to self-determination does 
not lend support to the Etchecolatz court’s interpretation. 
2. The Court’s Interpretation of a National Group from the Criminal 
Actor’s Subjective Perspective Does not Lend Support to its 
Conclusions 
The way the court in Etchecolatz envisages a national group also 
invokes the idea that the State itself defines the protected group. 
Since the national group consisted of those the State believed to be 
against Argentina’s interests, it was the State that determined who 
would be part of the targeted group.140 In other words, the State 
subjectively defined the group, as opposed to targeting a group with 
characteristics grounded in objective reality.141  
Various academics argue that one should determine the existence 
of a protected group by focusing on the criminal actor’s subjective 
definition of the group.142 Some of these authors not only support the 
 
 138. See, e.g., Lisson, supra note 9, at 1491–94 (arguing that the international 
community should view the East Timorese as a national group because they have a 
right to self-determination). 
 139. See id. at 1471–75 (conceding that the concept of self-determination is 
highly complicated, but explaining that on a general level the term refers to a 
group right to form an independent country). 
 140. See Etchecolatz, 19/9/2006, at Sec. IV.(b) “EL GENOCIDIO” [THE 
GENOCIDE] (emphasizing that the perpetrators of the crimes in Argentina did not 
randomly target their victims, but targeted those that the perpetrators had 
previously decided were against the State’s interests). 
 141. Cf. QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 155–56 (exploring the relevance of 
objective factors and asserting that although these should be present, subjective 
perceptions inevitably play a role in determining whether a targeted group 
constitutes one of the four protected groups). 
 142. See, e.g., FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND 
SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 23 (1990) 
(characterizing genocide as a one-sided criminal act in which the perpetrator 
defines a group and its members, and then attempts to eliminate both); THOMAS W. 
SIMON, THE LAWS OF GENOCIDE: PRESCRIPTION FOR A JUST WORLD 98 (2007) 
(arguing that courts should focus on the point of view of the individuals who 
intend to harm members of a particular group). 
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Etchecolatz decision, but go a step further and view any limitation on 
the protected groups as undesirable.143 This viewpoint focuses 
entirely on the perspective of the perpetrator, in the sense that any 
group the criminal actor chooses to target is sufficient for genocide, 
as long as the perpetrator intends to eliminate that group in whole or 
in part.144 
The ICTY’s holding in Jelisic regarding the determination of 
protected groups seems at first blush to support the subjective 
approach these academics have championed. In Jelisic the ICTY held 
that courts should determine the existence of protected groups based 
on the criminal actor’s subjective point of view.145 This interpretation 
only applies, however, if in the perpetrator’s mind he or she intends 
to destroy one of the groups that the Genocide Convention 
protects.146 The major difference between the holding in Jelisic and 
the  view  of  the  academics  is  that  the  academics  do  not limit the 
 
 
 143. See, e.g., Israel W. Charney, Toward A Generic Definition of Genocide, in 
GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 64, 74 (George J. 
Andreopoulos ed., 1994) (arguing that one should consider any mass killing a 
criminal actor perpetrates to be genocide regardless of whether it involves one of 
the four protected groups). 
 144. See, e.g., Eduardo Rezses, La Figura de Genocidio y el Caso Argentino: La 
Posibilidad de Adecuar Juridicamente una Figura Penal a Una Realidad Politica 
[Genocide and the Case of Argentina: The Possibility of Formulating a Legal 
Definition that Corresponds to a Political Reality], in APORTES JURIDICOS PARA EL 
ANALISIS Y JUZGAMIENTO DEL GENOCIDIO EN ARGENTINA [A LEGAL APPROACH TO 
THE ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT OF GENOCIDE IN ARGENTINA] 53, 61 (Eduardo 
Rezses ed., 2007) (arguing that with genocide, one cannot confine the victim 
groups to legal enumeration, because it is the perpetrator who determines what 
characteristics it will hone in on in the group it intends to destroy). 
 145. See Case No. ICTY 95-10-T, ¶ 70 (noting the significant difficulty of using 
purely objective factors to determine ethnic, racial, or national groups); see also 
SIMON, supra note 142, at 101 (clarifying that when the ICTY referred to the 
standard in Jelisic as subjective, it was signaling the perpetrator’s perspective, and 
not that of the targeted group); QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 155 (arguing that 
although cases like Jelisic focus on the perpetrator’s mind, some minimal objective 
factors are also necessary to conclude the existence of a protected group); Schabas, 
supra note 4, at 38-39 (asserting that the purely subjective view is flawed, and that 
the better approach is to have some objective grounding for determining the 
existence of a protected group). 
 146. See Jelisic, Case No. ICTY-95-10-T, ¶ 70 (limiting its interpretation to 
instances where the targeted group is either a racial, national, or ethnic group). 
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subjective view to the enumerated groups.147 Thus, Jelisic does not 
lend meaningful support to these academics’ point of view.  
Jelisic also does not lend support to the Etchecolatz decision, 
because even if one focused solely on the State’s subjective views 
about the group it was victimizing, one still cannot reach the 
conclusion that the State intended to eliminate a legally recognized 
protected group. This is the case because the group viewed from the 
State’s subjective view is a group of perceived political enemies.148 
The Genocide Convention, however, does not protect a group of 
subjectively perceived political subversives any more than it does a 
group of objectively real political dissidents.149 Since the victim 
group from the Argentine Government’s perspective was certainly a 
political group, the Jelisic decision does not support the argument 




 147. See, e.g., MÁNTARAS, supra note 91, at 68 (positing that the junta destroyed 
a national group which did not exist prior to the Dirty War, but rather was a group 
that the Government created fluidly as people displayed their disagreement with 
the State’s objectives). 
 148. See Tribunal Oral Federal de La Plata [Juzg. Fed.] [Federal Court of la 
Plata], 19/9/2006, “El Estado v. Etchecolatz, Miguel/juzgado penal,” [State v. 
Etchecolatz/criminal case] (Arg.), aff’d by Cámara Nacional de Casacion Penal 
[C.N.C.P.] [Criminal Court of Appeals], 18/5/2007, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recursos de casación e inconstitucionalidad,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/appeal challenging constitutionality] (Arg.), and Corte Suprema de 
Justicia [CSJN] [Supreme Court of Justice], 17/2/2009, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recurso extraordinario,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/Supreme Court 
appeal] (Arg.), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/etche.html 
(suggesting that the junta sometimes targeted people that it subjectively believed to 
be subversive, despite the fact that in objective reality the victims were completely 
indifferent to the regime). 
 149. See, e.g., Diaz et al. v. Columbia, Case 11.227, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 5/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶¶ 24-25 (1997) (holding inadmissible a 
claim brought by a Colombian political party alleging genocide because the 
targeting of political groups does not constitute genocide). 
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3. The Court’s Interpretation of National Group as all Argentines Is 
more Consistent with International Jurisprudence, but its 
Interpretation of the Destruction of a National Group “in Part” 
Goes Against Internationally Accepted Interpretations  
At the end of its genocide analysis the court in Etchecolatz refers 
to the national group as all Argentines.150 Although the court does not 
explicitly say so at this point in the opinion, it appears that the court 
is referring to everyone in the country during the Dirty War, and not 
just those who were Argentine citizens.151 Under the previously 
explored conceptions of national group, the court’s characterization 
of national group as everyone in Argentina is more acceptable. 
Under the cases that hold a protected group must be permanent or 
stable, it is possible to view the group of all Argentines as such a 
group. Although an estimated 30,000 Argentines disappeared during 
the Dirty War, the country’s borders did not change and there was no 
large-scale shift of Argentines to another nationality.152 Therefore, 
the Argentine population was stable.153 
The group of all Argentines also coincides with the Akayesu 
definition of national group, which focuses on the strength of a 
national’s bond with the country of which he or she is a national. By 
viewing the group as all people in Argentina, it logically follows that 
such a group did have strong bonds with the country in which it 
lived. However, that group would not include those immigrants or 
foreigners in Argentina who had stronger bonds with their home 
countries.154 Although the national group would not include such 
immigrants and foreigners, the national group of all other Argentines 
would still be viable.155  
 
 150. See Etchecolatz, 19/9/2006, at Sec. IV.(b) “EL GENOCIDIO” [THE 
GENOCIDE] (contending that the State intended to destroy this group in part). 
 151. See id. (referring to foreigners as part of the national group of Argentina). 
 152. C.f. SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 133 (explaining that dramatic changes in 
nationality usually occur when countries’ borders are altered and new countries are 
formed). 
 153. See id. (discussing the concept of stable and permanent groups). 
 154. See Nottebohm (Liech. V. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 6) (clarifying that 
one should consider a person a national of the state with which that person has the 
closest bonds). 
 155. See GUEST, supra note 59, at 64–65 (implying that the number of 
foreigners who disappeared in the Dirty War was rather small compared to the 
total number of disappearances). 
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But even if the group of all Argentines is a legitimate protected 
group, the court in Etchecolatz fails to prove that the State destroyed 
the national group in part.156 The court’s reasoning clashes with 
accepted international interpretations of the phrase “in part” from the 
Genocide Convention.157 
The problem with the court’s interpretation relates to the requisite 
mens rea. The Genocide Convention establishes that for acts to rise 
to the level of genocide, the criminal actor must carry out the 
prohibited act with the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part 
one of the Convention’s four protected groups “as such.”158 
Academics and courts have interpreted the “as such” clause to mean 
that the criminal actor must be targeting members of a protected 
group precisely because they belong to that protected group.159 If the 
criminal actor targets members of a protected group for reasons other 
than their group membership, the requisite mens rea is not present 
and the crime is not genocide.  
An example of where criminal actors did not have the required 
intent is Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia. In their ICJ draft memorial, 
Hannum and Hawk argued that genocide occurred in Cambodia 
because Pol Pot’s government intended to kill the Cambodian 
population in part.160 The problem with their argument, however, is 
that the Government did not target the Khmer people by virtue of the 
fact that they were of Khmer origin, but rather because the 
 
 156. See Etchecolatz, 19/9/2006, at Sec. IV.(b) “EL GENOCIDIO” [THE 
GENOCIDE] (“Given the inclusion of the term ‘in part’ in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention’s definition, it is evident that the Argentine national group has been 
destroyed ‘in part’ . . . .”) (Howard Shneider trans.). 
 157. See generally QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 140–45 (discussing different 
conceptions of group destruction in part). 
 158. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. 
 159. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 561 
(Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals 
Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004) (emphasizing that mere coincidence that the victimized 
individuals were part of the same group is not sufficient); RATNER & ABRAMS, 
supra note 25, at 286-87 (arguing that the victims of random, widespread violence 
are not victims of genocide because the inclusion of “as such” leads to the 
conclusion that the perpetrators must have targeted the victims because they 
belonged to a protected group). 
 160. See HUMAN RIGHTS MODULE, supra note 5, at 89, 92-93 (admonishing 
state parties to the ICJ for refusing to file a claim against Cambodia in the ICJ). 
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Government viewed them as subversive.161 As a result, the criminal 
actors lacked the requisite intent, and their crimes were not genocide.  
The Etchecolatz court’s interpretation has the same problem as 
Hannum and Hawk’s ICJ draft memorial. If the national group is all 
Argentines, in order to have the required intent the State must have 
targeted members of the group because of their Argentine 
nationality. What really happened, however, was that the State 
targeted an entire group of individuals it viewed as subversive, and in 
an attempt to destroy that entire group, successfully eliminated that 
group in part.162 The court therefore did not establish the necessary 
intent. The criminal actors did not intend to eliminate their victims 
because of their membership in the protected group of Argentine 
nationals.  
a. The Concept of Group Destruction in Part as Confined to a 
Particular Geographical Region Does not Support the Court’s 
Interpretation 
The interpretation of “in part” in the Krstic case also goes against 
the Etchecolatz view. In Krstic the ICTY held that genocide occurred 
because the perpetrators targeted the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, 
and intended to eliminate all the Bosnian Muslims in that region.163 
Krstic supports the conclusion then that if criminal actors intend to 
destroy a national group in a specific geographical region, then 
partial destruction of that group in that region constitutes genocide.164  
 
 161. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 25, at 286–87 (conceding that the 
Khmer people constitute a national group, but arguing that the Khmer Rouge did 
not target them because of their membership in that national group); QUIGLEY, 
supra note 12, at 127 (maintaining that the Khmer Rouge targeted the majority of 
its victims as members of economic or political groups, which are groups the 
Genocide Convention does not protect (quoting Jason Abrams, The Atrocities in 
Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide, 35 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 303, 307 (2001))). 
 162. See Amicus Brief, supra note 85 (positing that the Argentine Government 
targeted its victims for ideological and political reasons). 
 163. Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 598. 
 164. See id. at ¶ 559 (describing how the criminal actors targeted the Bosnian 
Muslims of Srebrenica specifically because they were part of the larger national 
group of all Bosnian Muslims). But see Katherine G. Southwick, Note, Srebrenica 
as Genocide? The Krstic Decision and the Language of the Unspeakable, 8 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 188, 206–08 (2005) (criticizing the reasoning in Krstic 
because the court failed to consider the possibility that the criminal actors targeted 
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Krstic does not support the Etchecolatz interpretation.165 The court 
in Etchecolatz did not argue that the Argentine Government intended 
to destroy a part of the Argentine national group that resided in a 
particular region of the country. Instead, the court argued that the 
State intended to kill a part of the Argentine national group which 
lived throughout the entire country.166 Therefore the idea of targeting 
a larger national group’s population that is confined to a particular 
geographical location does not apply in the case of Argentina.  
b. The Concept of Group Destruction in Part as the Destruction of a 
Substantial Part of the Group Does not Support the Court’s 
Interpretation  
Another way to measure what constitutes a group in part relates to 
the portion of that group that the criminal actors intend to 
eliminate.167 Under Jelisic, for example, for the actions of a criminal 
actor to constitute partial group destruction, that actor must intend to 
destroy a “substantial part of the group.”168 To determine whether the 
 
the group due to the fact that it consisted mostly of men of military age rather than 
because of the group’s Bosnian Muslim heritage). 
 165. See Southwick, supra note 164, at 195–96 (observing that an essential part 
of the Krstic court’s reasoning was its conclusion that the criminal actors intended 
to eliminate the Bosnian Muslim population of the particular region of Srebrenica). 
 166. See Tribunal Oral Federal de La Plata [Juzg. Fed.] [Federal Court of la 
Plata], 19/9/2006, “El Estado v. Etchecolatz, Miguel/juzgado penal,” [State v. 
Etchecolatz/criminal case] (Arg.), aff’d by Cámara Nacional de Casacion Penal 
[C.N.C.P.] [Criminal Court of Appeals], 18/5/2007, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recursos de casación e inconstitucionalidad,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/appeal challenging constitutionality] (Arg.), and Corte Suprema de 
Justicia [CSJN] [Supreme Court of Justice], 17/2/2009, “Etchecolatz, Miguel 
Osvaldo/recurso extraordinario,” [Etchecolatz, Miguel Osvaldo/Supreme Court 
appeal] (Arg.), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/etche.html 
(referring to attacks on supposed enemies of the state throughout Argentina as a 
whole, rather than any specified region). 
 167. See QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 139–42 (articulating how the travaux 
préparatoires of the Genocide Convention do not shed much light on what 
constitutes group destruction in part, but that subsequent interpretations of “in 
part” have breathed some life into the term). 
 168. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. ICTY-95-10-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 82 
(Dec. 14, 1999), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. ICTY-95-10-A, Appeals 
Judgment (July 5, 2001) (claiming that it is well established that criminal actors 
must destroy a substantial part of the protected group to constitute group 
destruction in part); see also Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶¶ 582-90 (discussing 
the prevalence of the requirement of destruction of a “substantial part” of a 
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criminal actor intended to destroy a substantial part of a protected 
group, courts have looked to the number of actual victims in 
proportion to the total number of people in the protected group.169 If 
the perpetrators eliminated only a very low percentage of the 
protected group, it is unlikely that a court will infer the intent to 
destroy the group in part.170  
Although the military junta killed approximately 30,000 
Argentines during the Dirty War, that number is probably 
insufficient to infer intent under the substantial part standard.171 With 
a population of over 29.3 million in 1983 at the end of the Dirty War, 
the 30,000 disappeared made up approximately one tenth of a 
percent of Argentina’s total population at the time.172 Although most 
cases have not set a minimum percentage from which one can infer 
the intent to destroy a substantial part of a group, it seems unlikely 
that this small ratio would qualify.173 
 
protected group, but refusing to endorse that reading); QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 
141 (describing the United States’ interpretation of the Genocide Convention, 
which asserts that the criminal actor must destroy the protected group to a point 
that it can no longer survive as a “viable entity” in the country where the 
destruction occurred). But see id. at 144 (arguing that the substantial part 
interpretation is not appropriate because it would not cover situations like the one 
in Argentina where many people were killed, but the number of victims only 
constitutes a small fraction of the country’s total population); Lippman, supra note 
106, at 464 (criticizing the standard of group destruction in substantial part, 
because such a conception creates too ambiguous a numerical limit for determining 
the occurrence of genocide). 
 169. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Def. 
Mots. to Acq., ¶ 69 (Sept. 3, 2001) (utilizing this formula to establish whether the 
accused had the specific intent to destroy a protected group in part). 
 170. See id. at ¶ 75 (explaining that the percentage of the group which the 
criminal actor actually eliminated is not the sole factor for determining the 
requisite intent, but implying that it is an important factor). 
 171. Cf. id. at ¶¶ 69–75 (Sept. 3, 2001) (finding that the defendant victimized 
between 2 and 2.8 percent of the Bosnian Muslims in his municipality, which the 
court held was not a substantial enough part of the population of Bosnian Muslims 
in the municipality from which to infer the intent to destroy the protected group in 
part). 
 172. See Argentina, INDEX MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/ 
argentina/population.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2010) (listing key statistics regarding 
Argentina’s population since 1980). 
 173. See QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 142 (pointing out that in at least one ICTY 
case—Prosecutor v. Sikirica—the court did seem to require an actual minimum 
percentage of group elimination to find partial group destruction). 
SHNEIDER_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:15 PM 
2010] POLITICAL GENOCIDE IN LATIN AMERICA 347 
E. THE ARGUMENT IN MENCHÚ’S COMPLAINT THAT GENOCIDE 
OCCURRED IN GUATEMALA IS FLAWED IN THE SAME WAY AS 
SCILINGO  
Guatemalan Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú and 
others filed a complaint in Spanish courts alleging that certain 
Guatemalan officials committed acts of genocide, torture, terrorism, 
summary execution, and unlawful detention during the Guatemalan 
civil war.174 After a long series of challenges involving both Spanish 
and Guatemalan courts, it appears that Menchú’s complaint will 
ultimately not go forward.175 Nonetheless, Menchú’s complaint is 
telling in that it alleges genocide using reasoning similar to that in 
Scilingo.176 
Menchú’s complaint made two arguments. First, it argued that 
genocide occurred in Guatemala because state officials targeted an 
ethnic group—the Mayan people.177 Second, the complaint claimed 
that the State perpetrated genocide against a national group of 
Guatemalans.178 The State identified this national group based on the 
State’s belief that the members of the group posed a threat to the 
 
 174. See Menchú’s Complaint, supra note 71, at paras. 4-8; Roht-Arriaza, supra 
note 66, at 84–85 (explaining that the investigating judge of the Audiencia 
accepted the complaint because it involved Spanish victims and Guatemalan courts 
had refused to prosecute the crimes). 
 175. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 66, at 94–101 (summarizing the Guatemalan 
Constitutional Court’s December 2007 decision invalidating Spain’s arrest 
warrants against the Guatemalan defendants). 
 176. See Menchú’s Complaint, supra note 71, at Sec. B “HECHOS” [FACTS] 
(discussing the historical targeting of a group based on the group’s political 
motivations). 
 177. See STS [Spanish Supreme Court], Sala de lo Penal [Criminal Chamber], 
Feb. 25, 2003 (No. 327/2003), translated in Judicial and Similar Proceedings, 
Spanish Supreme Court: Guatemala Genocide Case, 42 I.L.M. 686, 696 (2003) 
(accepting, arguendo, in an opinion that did not reach the merits of the case, that 
the Guatemalan Government perpetrated genocide against the “Mayan people as an 
ethnic group”); Menchú’s Complaint, supra note 73, at Sec. B “HECHOS” [FACTS] 
(arguing that the State targeted Guatemalans of Mayan origin because they 
belonged to the ethnic group of Mayan people, which the Government considered 
to be a group working against the State’s interests). 
 178. See Menchú’s Complaint, supra note 73, at Sec. C “CRONOLOGIA SOBRE EL 
CARACTER DE LOS GOBIERNOS” [CHRONOLOGY OF THE GOVERNMENTS’ 
CHARACTER] (focusing on the State’s detailed and systematic plan to eliminate 
perceived enemies as proof that the State committed genocide against a national 
group). 
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Guatemalan Government.179 This argument is parallel to the 
Audiencia’s decision in Scilingo; and like Scilingo, Menchú’s claim 
is also unconvincing in light of relevant international jurisprudence 
and scholarship. However, the argument further shows 
dissatisfaction with the current narrow definition of genocide,180 and 
illustrates the precedential value of Scilingo for future complainants 
alleging genocide in Spanish courts.181 
F. MENCHÚ’S COMPLAINT PRESENTS A CONVINCING ARGUMENT 
THAT THE OVERLAP BETWEEN CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND 
GENOCIDE SHOULD NOT LIMIT THE SCOPE OF WHAT THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CONSIDERS GENOCIDE  
Menchú’s complaint also takes note of the fact that the definition 
of crimes against humanity protects political groups.182 Despite the 
fact that prosecutors can charge those who attempt to destroy a 
political group with committing crimes against humanity, Menchú’s 
complaint asserts that this should not affect how courts interpret the 
definition of genocide.183 Despite the potential overlap of crimes 
against   humanity  and  genocide,  Menchú’s  complaint  claims  that 
 
 
 179. See id. (emphasizing that even a person’s mere physical presence in a 
certain place at a certain time could give the State a reason to perceive that person 
as a dissident, and subsequently eliminate that person). 
 180. See also Charney, supra note 143, at 71 (expressing frustration that under 
the current understanding of genocide, killings on a mass scale will not qualify as 
genocide if the victim group is either heterogeneous or made up of native citizens 
of the same country that is eliminating them). 
 181. See EDWARDS, supra note 136, at 25–28 (implying that the prior decisions 
of the court in which you are arguing a case are mandatory authority). 
 182. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6(c), 
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (“Crimes against humanity: namely, 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds . . . .”) (emphasis added); 
Menchú’s Complaint, supra note 71, at Sec. J “Analisis de los Actos de Genocidio 
Consignados en el Informe de la CEH a la Luz de la Legislacion Española” 
[Analysis on the Acts of Genocide Identified in the CEH Report in Light of 
Spanish Legislation] (referencing the definition of crimes against humanity in the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg). 
 183. See Menchú’s Complaint, supra note 73, at Sec. J (recognizing that 
throughout history the attempted destructions of the four protected groups from the 
Genocide Convention have invariably involved political motivations). 
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courts still should interpret the targeting of a group because of its 
perceived or actual political ideology as genocide.184  
Human rights scholarship both supports and contradicts the 
complaint’s claim. Some argue that because a prosecutor could 
charge the destruction of political groups under crimes against 
humanity, it would cause unnecessary confusion to allow such 
crimes to constitute genocide as well.185 Others argue simply that the 
intention of the drafters is clear, and since they specifically left out 
political groups, the only remedy is to prosecute crimes against such 
groups as crimes against humanity.186  
Different scholars, however, point out that despite the overlap 
between crimes against humanity and genocide, there are times when 
there is a gap between the two crimes.187 Genocide is a crime that 
requires the specific intent to destroy a group in whole or in part, but 
does not require any particular context in which that intent arises.188 
Crimes against humanity, on the other hand, require that the criminal 
actor commit the prohibited acts “as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.”189 There could conceivably be a situation 
 
 184. See id. (arguing that one should not read the Genocide Convention to 
exclude political motivations, but rather interpret it as requiring that the political 
motivations manifest themselves in the destruction of one of the four protected 
groups—which in the case of Guatemala involved a national group). 
 185. See, e.g., Amicus Brief, supra note 85 (arguing that since Scilingo’s actions 
constitute crimes against humanity, the Audiencia’s broad interpretation of 
genocide was inappropriate). 
 186. See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 119–20, 144 (positing that mass 
killings like the ones carried out by the Khmer Rouge clearly fit the definition of 
crimes against humanity). 
 187. See, e.g., David L. Nersessian, Comparative Approaches to Punishing 
Hate: The Intersection of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 43 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 221, 246-63 (2007) (analyzing the differences between the crime against 
humanity of persecution and the crime of genocide, including the policy elements 
of the crimes and the necessity that persecution be committed along with another 
international crime). 
 188. See id. at 263 (distinguishing genocide from other international crimes 
because it can be charged as an inchoate offense, relying on the importance of 
proving intent). 
 189. Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 7(1); see Nersessian, supra note 187, at 
259 (explaining that crimes against humanity are not attacks on groups—as is 
genocide—but rather are attacks on individuals in the context of a systematic 
attack). 
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where a systematic plan to destroy a political group is not yet being 
executed, but a criminal actor does have the specific intent required 
for genocide.190 In such a case, in the absence of the crime of 
political genocide, prosecutors would not be able to charge the 
criminal actor with either a crime against humanity or genocide, thus 
leaving an important gap.191  
Moreover, because specific intent is the key component to 
genocide, the genocide does not need to be complete in order to 
charge someone with the crime.192 Conversely, prosecutors cannot 
legitimately charge an individual with crimes against humanity until 
a widespread attack on civilians is well established.193 Thus, as a 
crime against humanity, one would be powerless to stop attacks on a 
political group until a widespread attack is clearly in effect.194 If 
political genocide were a crime, however, international law would 
have the tools to prevent such acts before they flourish into a full-
blown systematic attack.195  
Others argue that despite the overlap between crimes against 
humanity and genocide, there is nothing impeding courts from taking 
a more expansive view of genocide.196 Rather than focus on 
 
 190. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 203-04 (2d ed. 1999) (recognizing that the 
intentional killing of only one person can constitute genocide if the criminal actor 
has the specific intent to eliminate the protected group in whole or in part). 
 191. See Nersessian, supra note 187, at 258-59 (referencing other gaps between 
crimes against humanity and genocide, such as the targeting of military forces, 
which genocide covers but crimes against humanity do not). 
 192. See id. at 263 (recognizing that because genocide is an inchoate offense, 
international law can intervene to stop acts of genocide before the criminal actors 
meet their goal of group destruction). 
 193. See id. (emphasizing that the perpetrator’s knowledge that an act of 
violence is a part of an already established large-scale attack is required to satisfy 
the mens rea of a crime against humanity). 
 194. See id. (positing that political groups will suffer substantial harm before 
prosecutors have the chance to charge criminal actors with crimes against 
humanity). 
 195. See id. at 261 (explaining that the drafters of the Genocide Convention 
chose to make genocide an inchoate crime because waiting for criminal actors to 
translate their intent to destroy a group into reality would make intervention futile). 
 196. See Van Schaack, supra note 21, at 2283–84 (asserting that the inclusion of 
political groups in the definition of crimes against humanity reflects a jus cogens 
norm against the targeting of such groups, and thus actually supports the claim that 
the Genocide Convention also protects political groups). 
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jurisprudence and the drafters’ intent, these critics argue the focus 
should be on the present will of the international community.197 Since 
various victim groups feel more vindicated when courts classify the 
crimes against them as genocide, prosecutors should be able to freely 
charge defendants with both genocide and crimes against humanity 
in situations where the two crimes seem to overlap.198 The claim in 
Menchú’s complaint regarding the intersection of crimes against 
humanity and genocide seems to be a further manifestation of the 
common concern of victim groups.199  
These arguments support the claim in Menchú’s complaint that the 
overlap between crimes against humanity and genocide should not 
prevent labeling the targeting of political groups as genocide.200 
Nonetheless, even if the complaint is correct in claiming that 
prosecutors should be able to charge the victimization of political 
groups as either crimes against humanity or genocide, the weight of 
international jurisprudence still holds that such actions are not 
genocide. As a result, until international law considers the targeting 
of political groups as a valid form of genocide, prosecutors will 
continue to be wary of charging the perpetrators of such crimes with 
genocide.  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Although the expanded interpretation of genocide in the cases 
discussed above are positive in the sense that they allow for more 
accountability, they do not conform to the internationally accepted 
 
 197. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 6 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L.R. 621, 633 (2006) (suggesting that in the popular 
psyche of the international community, the concept of genocide “has taken on a 
life of its own”). 
 198. See id. (stressing that often the survivors and families of victims of mass 
killings do not feel that justice has been served when such courts find the criminal 
actors guilty of only crimes against humanity and not genocide). 
 199. See id. (speculating that ultimately the international community may have 
to satisfy the popular will of victim groups by developing a new legal term that 
will condemn mass killings in a more comprehensive and effective manner). 
 200. See Menchú’s Complaint, supra note 71, at Sec. K “Procedencia de la 
Jurisdicción Española para Entender en Estos Casos de Genocidio” [Origins of 
Spanish Jurisprudence] (arguing that although the Nuremberg Charter codifies the 
targeting of political groups as a crime against humanity, this does not imply that 
one cannot consider crimes motivated solely for political reasons to be genocide). 
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definition of genocide. Moreover, the courts’ expansive view of 
national group could swallow the definition and open the door to 
classifying almost any mass killing as genocide.201 Considering that 
these interpretations cut against traditional views and endanger the 
definition of genocide itself, they are too expansive.202  
Nonetheless, such interpretations show a distinct frustration with 
the current definition of genocide, and illustrate the definition’s 
shortcomings. Rather than continue the proliferation of this 
expansive interpretation, the international community should 
reconsider the definition itself, and explicitly add political groups.203  
A. ADOPTING DOMESTIC LEGISLATION  
One option for working to change the definition of genocide is to 
legislate nationally.204 If enough countries pass legislation that 
includes political groups as a protected group, such state practice 
could eventually blossom into customary international law.205 
Moreover, if countries implement an expanded domestic definition 
of genocide, the restrictive international interpretation will not force 
local courts to use torturous reasoning to conclude that genocide 
occurred if criminal actors target a political group.206 Multiple 
 
 201. See SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 150 (asserting that if one can consider any 
human group to be a national group, as the court did in Scilingo, then there is little 
to prevent the crime of genocide from applying to any mass killing, thereby 
potentially trivializing the crime). 
 202. See SIMON, supra note 142, at 96 (arguing against the elimination of 
enumerated protected groups, because such an approach would take away the key 
genos element of genocide, which is what makes genocide the worst international 
crime). 
 203. See QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 83 (noting that various analysts have 
argued that the international community should add political groups to the list of 
protected groups, though recognizing that the possibility of this redefinition 
occurring is minimal). 
 204. See SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 141–42 (observing that most states have 
domestic genocide statutes that track the Genocide Convention’s definition 
verbatim). 
 205. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 79–81 (elaborating how state practice 
is the first step towards creating customary international law which will 
theoretically be binding on the international community). 
 206. See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 141 (referencing Ethiopia as a country 
that prosecuted the crime of genocide against a political group, based on the 
country’s genocide statute). 
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countries have already adopted such legislation.207 Nonetheless, not 
nearly enough countries have such legislation that one could claim a 
new custom has formed.208  
B. AMENDING THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
Another option for including political group as a protected group 
is to amend the Genocide Convention itself.209 Countries may argue 
that it is unnecessary to amend the definition of genocide because 
crimes against humanity already cover the targeting of political 
groups. While courts often can prosecute such crimes as crimes 
against humanity, as discussed above, there are instances when 
crimes against humanity are not adequate to prevent the targeting of 
political groups. In particular, when a systematic plan to eliminate 
political opponents is in its nascent stages, prosecutors cannot yet 
charge those planning the attack with crimes against humanity. If, on 
the other hand, genocide also protected political groups, then such 
criminal actors could face charges of genocide if they had the 
requisite specific intent and carried out just one of the acts prohibited 
by the Genocide Convention.  
Furthermore, the value of convicting someone of a crime is not 
only in meting out punishment, but also in serving as a deterrent. 
Although people certainly view crimes against humanity as horrific, 
such crimes do not bring to mind the same scale of tragedy as 
genocide.210 That is why people commonly consider genocide, and 
 
 207. See id. (recognizing that the penal codes of Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Panama, 
Costa Rica, Peru, Slovenia, and Lithuania all include the targeting of political 
groups in their domestic legislation punishing genocide). 
 208. Compare id. at 150 (arguing that it is “wishful thinking” to conclude that 
the requisite opinio juris and state practice exists to the point that customary 
international law embraces a definition of genocide which includes political 
groups), with Van Schaack, supra note 21, at 2280–86 (claiming that the 
combination of Resolution 96(I), national legislation defining genocide, other 
international agreements protecting political groups, and popular community 
standards regarding genocide add up to a jus cogens norm that defines genocide as 
including the destruction of political groups). 
 209. See SCHABAS, supra note 8, at 518–19 (describing the procedures 
envisaged by the Genocide Convention for amending the Convention, and 
explaining that the state parties could conceivably amend the Convention even 
though no attempts to do so have taken place thus far). 
 210. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Trial Judgment, ¶ 
16 (Sept. 4, 1998), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, 
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not crimes against humanity, as the worst type of international crime 
one can commit.211 By expanding the definition, nations can help 
ensure that the international community more roundly condemns the 
targeting of political groups, and more effectively stigmatizes those 
who perpetrate such acts by labeling them perpetrators of 
genocide.212  
Finally, expanding the definition of genocide in an international 
instrument will help meet the requirements of fair labeling.213 If a 
criminal actor carries out acts prohibited by the Genocide 
Convention with the specific intent to destroy a political group in 
whole or in part, such a crime is more serious than a crime against 
humanity.214 This is the case because if the criminal actor succeeds in 
his or her goal, the result will be the elimination of an entire group, 
rather than just an individual, or individuals, as occurs with a crime 
against humanity.215 If the international community expands the 
definition of genocide to include political groups, then the more 
accurate label of genocide could apply to acts aimed at eliminating a 
political group in whole or in part.216 
CONCLUSION 
The internationally accepted definition of genocide is 
unnecessarily restrictive. The interpretations of genocide in cases 
 
Appeals Judgment (Sept. 19, 2000) (characterizing genocide as the “crime of 
crimes”). 
 211. See Nersessian, supra note 187, at 262 (recognizing that genocide is widely 
viewed as the most serious crime in existence, both domestically and 
internationally). 
 212. See id. at 256 (explaining that the label society attaches to a crime both 
stigmatizes the offender for conduct contrary to societal norms and communicates 
to the public the type of offense committed). 
 213. See id. at 255 (defining fair labeling as a principle aimed at ensuring that a 
label for a criminal act correctly reflects that crime’s wrongfulness and severity). 
 214. See id. at 262 (arguing that the conduct and mens rea associated with 
genocide result in a higher level of injury to society than the acts and mens rea 
associated with crimes against humanity). 
 215. See id. (explaining that differentiating between crimes against humanity 
and genocide “validates an important distinction between serious discrimination 
against individuals and acts aimed at destroying the larger groups to which those 
individuals belong”). 
 216. See id. at 263-64 (asserting that crimes against humanity cannot simply 
serve as a substitute for the more serious crime of genocide). 
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arising out of the Argentine Dirty War and Guatemalan civil war are 
unconvincing in light of prevailing international standards. 
Nonetheless, these cases show a distinct frustration with the current 
definition of genocide. Rather than leave courts to struggle with this 
restrictive definition, the international community should work to 
expand the definition to include the victimization of political groups. 
 
